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• Abbreviations 
ADES: Association Démocratie Ecologie Solidarité 
AMF: Association des Maires de France 
CES: Conseil Economique et Social 
CFDT: Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail 
CGT: Confédération Générale du Travail 
cm: cubic metres 
COGESE: Compagnie de Gestion des Eaux du Sud-Est 
CRC: Chambre Régionale des Comptes 
DGCCRF: Direction générale de la consommation, de la concurrence et de la répression des fraudes 
EPIC: établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial local 
FF: French Francs 
FNCCR: Fédération Nationale des Collectivités Concédantes et Régie 
GdE: Générale des Eaux 
LdE: Lyonnaise des Eaux 
OTV: Omnium de Traitement et Valorisation (Vivendi-GdE engineering subsidiary) 
PCF: Parti Communiste Français 
pcm: per cubic meter 
PPP: public-private partnership 
PS: Parti Socialiste 
RPR: Rassemblement pour la République 
SDA: Société Dauphinoise d’Assainissement 
SDEI: Société de Distribution d’Eau Intercommunale 
SEG: Société des Eaux de Grenoble 
SEREPI: Société d’Exploitation des Réseaux d’Eau Potable Intercommunaux 
SGEA: Société Grenobloise de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement 
SITA: Société Industrielle de Transports Automobiles SA 
SIVOM: Syndicat Intercommunal à Vocation Multiple 
UDF: 
US$: US Dollars 
VAT: Value Added Tax 
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• Notes on company names and terminology 
Suez-Lyonnaise  is used to refer to the group now called simply Suez, whose water division is now 
named Ondeo. At the start of the events in Grenoble the company was known as Lyonnaise des Eaux, 
later as Dumez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, and then as Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux before its current name of 
Suez. 
Vivendi-GdE  is used to refer to the group known as Generale des Eaux (GdE) until 1998, when it 
was renamed Vivendi, and then Vivendi-Universal in 2000.  In the same year the division dealing with 
public services became a company called Vivendi Environnement, whose water section is Vivendi 
Water. 
Régie – a municipal operation, capable of various forms, which has separate accounts from the 
council but is 100% owned and controlled by the council. 
Concession, affermage, contract, delegated management – are used to reflect French usage 
as far as possible when discussing Grenoble. In discussions of the international implications, 
‘concession’ is used broadly to cover all forms of privatisation or delegated management of water or 
sanitation systems. 
 
• Full version 
This paper is a condensed version of a full report on Grenoble, to include details of events, which will 
be published by PSIRU in September 2001. 
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Grenoble is a city in south-eastern France, with a population of about 150,000.  Water supply and 
sanitation in the city of Grenoble were delegated under affermage contracts to a subsidiary of Suez-
Lyonnaise in November 1989.  The sanitation service in the region of greater Grenoble (population 
372,500) was delegated earlier, in 1985, to a joint venture owned equally by Suez-Lyonnaise and 
Vivendi-GdE   
 
These privatisations of water supply and sanitation in Grenoble were facilitated by bribery of local 
politicians; they were costly to the citizens of Grenoble, because the companies charged more than 
was justifiable by their expenditure, and exploited privileged access to subcontracting; and there was 
throughout a lack of transparency and accountability.  
 
After a decade of political activity directed at the contractors, and a series of civil and criminal court 
cases, Grenoble city council finally decided in the year 2000 to terminate the private contracts and 
replace them (with one partial exception) by a municipal service through two new régies. 
 
The experiences of Grenoble provide a number of important lessons about the management, 
regulation and financing of water supply and sanitation. 
 
 Table 1 :  Services covered by Grenoble contracts and remunicipalisations  






1989-1995 Contract: COGESE Concession: SDA 
1996-2000 Contract: SEG 




2 The Grenoble city water and sanitation contracts 
2.1 The award of the contract, 1989 
In 1984, the then Mayor of Grenoble Alain Carignon, initiated a new policy in favour of private sector 
participation in gas, electricity and water services.  Carignon was a prominent member of RPR, the 
party whose general secretary from 1976 to 1978 was Jérôme Monod, then chairman of the major 
water company Lyonnaise des Eaux (now part of Suez).   
 
In 1989, Carignon proposed privatisation of the city’s water services to Suez-Lyonnaise subsidiary 
COGESE (Compagnie de Gestion des Eaux du Sud-Est).  
 
The deal went ahead in spite of strong opposition led by the ecologist party ADES (Association 
Démocratie Ecologie Solidarité ) and the trade unions (CGT and CFDT) , which included strikes, 
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demonstrations and a court petition against the privatisation plan from the trade unions, consumers 
and citizens associationsi.  Despite this opposition, Grenoble city council voted on 3rd November 1989 
to award a  25-year long water supply and sanitation contract to COGESE.  
 
The 1989 privatisation  ended more than a century of municipal provision of water supply in Grenoble. 
At the time of privatisation, municipal water supply was very efficient in the light of the extremely low 
price to consumers and good quality of water supplied and service provided. Municipal management 
was also financially sound as, despite the low water price, the service was profitable and regularly 
contributed to the municipal budget. 
2.2 Corruption and convictions of Carignon and Suez-Lyonnaise executives 
In 1994 examining magistrates in France began examining a number of public service concessions for 
corruption, including the Grenoble deal. They concluded that the water service was privatised in 
exchange for contributions by Lyonnaise des Eaux to Carignon’s electoral campaign, and other gifts, 
totalling over FF 19 million, and  prosecuted Carignon, and two executives of Suez-Lyonnaise.   
 
In 1995 both Carignon – who was by then minister of communications in the central government - 
and Jean-Jacques Prompsey, a Lyonnaise des Eaux executive, who was by then chief executive of the 
worldwide business of SITA, Lyonnaise’s waste management division - were convicted of respectively 
accepting and paying bribes, and sentenced to prison. These sentences were increased on appeal, to 
4 years and 1 year respectively. The courts also ruled   that the corrupt deal had damaged consumers 
and allowed consumers to claim compensation, fixed at a total of FF 300,000 by the Chambéry Cour 
d’Appel on 10th June 1998 ii.  
 
2.3 The costs of the corrupt contract 
 
The COGESE contract proved costly to the citizens of Grenoble, because the company used a number 
of techniques which inflated the prices charged to consumers.   
2.3.1 Charging for ‘entry fees’ 
As part of the contract, the company agreed to pay to the municipality “entry fees” worth  
FF226million, with annual payments each year iii.  This economic inducement to privatisation was 
subsequently paid for by the consumers, because COGESE recovered the cost through charging users: 
the “entry fee” thus became an indirect form of taxation.  In May 1999 the Grenoble Tribunal 
Administratif declared illegal the part of water supply and sewerage tariffs imposed by COGESE which 
recovered the “entry fees” iv. This practice is now generally illegal in France, as French law requires 
water operators to charge consumers only for the service provided v.   
2.3.2 Exclusive works contracts 
COGESE had exclusive rights to nearly all works contracts, which was therefore an extra source of 
profits for Lyonnaise des Eaux additional to the contract itself.  COGESE annual reports, however, did 
not account for these profits from works contracts vi . 
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2.3.3 Indexing of prices 
COGESE manipulated indexation in two ways which resulted in over-charging.  Firstly, base prices 
were fixed at their value on 1st January 1989 rather than 1st July 1989 vii. Eau Secours estimate that 
this added between 4% and 5% to prices during this period.  Secondly, users were charged using the 
price level at the time of invoicing, established after applying indexation  from base values on 1st 
January and 1st July each year, rather than the price at the time of consumption; this was declared 
illegal in May 1999 by the  Grenoble Tribunal Administratif. viii ix.  Eau Secours estimate that from 1989 
to 1995 over 51% of invoices were inflated by these techniques, by a total of FF 21 million.  
2.3.4 Fictitious accounting 
COGESE reported losses each year, and then added each year the amount it would have paid if it had 
taken out a loan to balance its accounts. By 1993, this practice meant COGESE was reporting FF 7 
million debt service although true debt interest was only FF 2.88 million. COGESE claimed that this 
was a way to remunerate the shareholders without taking out a loan to balance its accounts.  The 
Chambre Régionale des Comptes however condemned the company for creating fictitious costs which 
would have remained for long in the company accounts even after the operator had broken even x. 
2.3.5 Cost to citizens 
The CRC estimated in 1995 that the total cost of these practices to the citizens of Grenoble, over the 
25-year life of the COGESE contract,  was in excess of FF 1 billion. xi 
 
 Table 2 :  Cost to citizens of COGESE practices 
Source CRC estimate 
over 25 years; excluding VAT) 
Costs to Consumers (Excess Charges)  
FF 830m 
Excess Costs to Taxpayers 
 
FF 179m 
Total Excess Costs (1989-2014) FF 1,009m 
 
 
2.4 Renegotiation – the public-private partnership 
In 1995, the courts convicted executives of Suez-Lyonnaise, and the former mayor, of corruption. The 
1995 elections also changed control of the municipality, with the new majority led by the socialist 
party and the ecologist party ADES. ADES favoured termination of the contract and remunicipalisation, 
but the majority was deterred by the prospect of having to pay compensation of between FF 150m 
and FF 400m, including the return of the entry fees. 
 
In May 1996 a new company was created, Société des Eaux de Grenoble (SEG). It was 51% owned 
by the council, and 49% by Suez-Lyonnaise; the council appointed 7 directors, the company 5; but 
Suez-Lyonnaise held a veto over all major decisions and specifically over any decisions on investment 
policy, conclusion of contracts with other municipalities, modification of agreements with Grenoble 
municipality and modification of personnel xii.    
 
Grenoble: private to public         29/01/21 
 
 __________________________________________________________________________  
PSIRU       www.psiru.org     Page - 8 - 
 
 
But SEG then immediately sub-contracted water supply and sanitation for 15 years to another 
company, Société Grenobloise de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement (SGEA) which was 100% owned by 
Suez-Lyonnaise. And SGEA acquired most of the expertise - only 5 people were transferred to the 
joint venture SEG,  the other 82 staff were transferred into SGEA, the 100% Lyonnaise operating 
subsidiary xiii. 
2.4.1 Liabilities and dividends – boosting Suez-Lyonnaise profits 
The new joint venture, SEG, had a number of financial advantages from the point of view of Suez-
Lyonnaise. It meant that Grenoble city council accepted to share liability for any damage caused by 
COGESE, for example damage to consumers. Also, the municipality took on FF 30 million of COGESE 
debt xiv. 
 
The entry fees were declared illegal, and water prices were reduced as a result, with consumers 
gaining FF 11.9 m. However, the loss of entry fees cost the city council a total FF 22.7 million, which 
represented a loss to citizens as taxpayers. The difference meant that Suez-Lyonnaise gained by FF11 
m. xv 
 
The council also agreed to hand over part of its entitlement to dividends from SEG  to Suez-Lyonnaise,  
to compensate for the ‘losses’ suffered by COGESE in the previous 5 years. Lyonnaise got FF 51m., 
and the city council got FF12.75 m xvi.  But the “losses” suffered by COGESE were fictitious (see 
above) , and included the cost of entry fees for which they had illegally charged users. Under the 
renegotiated deal these costs would instead be paid for by the city council giving up its dividends. 
 
2.4.2 Tariffs rise for reduced consumption 
The contract also provided that the price of water would increase if consumption fell below 12.8 m. 
cubic metres a year. In a city where consumption was already falling, this formula meant that prices 
increased immediately xvii.  
 
Eau Secours estimate that in fiscal year 1996 alone, tariff increases brought to SEG excess income of 
FF 13.7 million for water and FF 2.3 million for sanitation. 
 
2.4.3 Cascade of sub-contracts to Suez-Lyonnaise 
Sub-contracting by SEG to the Suez-Lyonnaise subsidiary SGEA also resulted in Lyonnaise des Eaux 
enjoying an increasing proportion of profits: SEG guaranteed that it would increase the payments to 
SGEA in the 6th and the 11th year of the sub-contract, without SGEA adopting any new operating risks. 
 
On turn, SGEA subcontracted several services to Lyonnaise des Eaux at extremely high prices - 
including legal services, accounting, insurance and property management, human resources, customer 
services, technical assistance, vehicles, equipment procurement, information technology and SGEA 
management. As a result, SGEA recorded losses, which corresponded in reality to profits for other 
Lyonnaise des Eaux subsidiaries. And  it was all protected by a guarantee that SEG/SGEA losses would 
be compensated for by the municipality upon termination of the contracts xviii.  
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2.5 Termination and remunicipalisation 
2.5.1 Court rulings declare both contracts illegal 
ADES however continued with the legal fight and, in October 1997, the original decision to delegate 
the water service to COGESE was annulled by the French Conseil d’Etat for being illegal xix.  
ADES also challenged the validity of the 1996 renegotiated contract with SEG, and  in August 1998, 
Grenoble Tribunal Administratif declared void the City Council decisions to delegate the services to 
SEG/SGEA as  the procedure was not publicised nor competitivexx. The Tribunal Administratif ruling 
also cancelled water rates imposed by SEG, which still incorporated the “costs” of corruption, and the 
statutory rules allowing SEG to invoice users, and in May 1999 the water supply and sewerage tariffs 
imposed by COGESE were declared illegal for being indexed retroactively and compensating the “entry 
fees” disbursed to the municipality xxi, xxii. All charges for the whole period 1990-1998 had thus been 
invalidated. 
2.5.2 Remunicipalisation 
The city council then debated various options and finally, on 20th March 2000, voted to re-municipalise 
water supply under a “régie à autonomie financière et personnalité morale” – a municipally-owned 
enterprise formally separate from the council. This form was chosen as the best option to enable the 
transfer of all staff who had been employed by COGESE and then SEG or SGEA xxiii. 
 
3 The Grenoble region sanitation concession 
A similar sequence of events unfolded in relation to sanitation in the metropolitan region of Grenoble.  
This aspect has been less publicised.  
3.1.1 The options: municipal or private 
In 1983 the syndicate of municipalities of the metropolitan region of Grenoble (SIEPARG) carried out a 
review of the sanitation service. They developed a detailed plan based on the continuation of a 
municipal service, including investment in a new wastewater treatment plant, Aquapole. xxiv  However 
this plan was abandoned in April 1985, when SIEPARG awarded a 25-year long concession for 
sanitation services to Société Dauphinoise d'Assainissement (SDA), a joint venture formed by 
Degremont (owned by Suez-Lyonnaise) and OTV (owned by Vivendi-Generale)  xxv.  
3.1.2 A non-competitive and costly private concession 
This concession was given to  SDA without any competitive tender; and SDA itself was a joint venture 
between  the two major water groups of France. It was also the more expensive option:  the regional 
audit office later showed that the consumer had to pay 2.71F pcm for the private option as against 
2.05 F for the municipal option. xxvi  It has been claimed that this choice was made in return for 
political donations distributed to the political parties in accordance with their representation on 
SIEPARG - FF 70 million to the RPR-UDF, and FF 30 million to each of the PS (Socialist Party) and PCF 
(Communist Party). xxvii 
3.1.3 Renegotiation in favour of concessionaire 
Between 1985 and 1993, the concession was renegotiated nine times in favour of the concessionaire. 
The investment required from SDA was reduced, while its profits were increased.  In practice, 
although the rationale for privatisation was to tap private finance, the majority of finance for the 
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wastewater treatment plant was procured by public sector bodies – the municipalities and the Agence 
de l’Eau. 
3.1.4 Political opposition 
The elections of 1995 resulted in a change in political control in Grenoble, and the new majority 
negotiated some revisions to the contract in May 1996 and again in 1998:    
• more systematic information and greater transparency from the concessionaire,  with penalties 
for  failure to produce the required information.  
• SDA’s rate of return was cut from 14.31% to 9.70%, cutting prices by FF 0.63 pcm.  
• The municipalities raised a loan to buy investments already made at a favourable price of 81M 
FF: this increased tariffs by FF 0.25 pcm; As a result, there was a net decrease in the price of 
wastewater of   FF 0.38 pcm -  a cut of 8%. xxviii 
3.1.5 Remunicipalisation  
The 1997 report of the Chambre régionale des Comptes exposed in more detail how the wastewater 
concession was marred by numerous problems with performance and costs and lack of transparency. 
This prompted further action by the municipalities, culminating in re-municipalisation  of  wastewater 
services.  Another renegotiation in 1998 introduced higher service standards, cut the company’s profit 
margins still further, reduced  wastewater charges by a further FF 0.09 pcm xxix. In January 2000 a 
new municipal régie was created to take over sanitation services for the region from SDA (and also 
the sanitation service for the city, from SEG). Only the Aquapole treatment plant itself was left under 
a private concession with SDA. xxx.   
 
 
 Table 3 :  Summary chronology of Grenoble privatisations and remunicipalisations  
Date Event 




Privatisation of water and sanitation in city of Grenoble to COGESE (Suez-
Lyonnaise) 
June 1995 Elections result in change in political power to socialist/green group.  
November 
1995 
Former mayor and Suez-Lyonnaise executives convicted of corruption 
May 1996 Renegotiation. Creation of SEG (joint venture between Grenoble and  Suez-
Lyonnaise) 
1996 - 1999 Court cases, audit reports, further renegotiation  
January 2000  Remunicipalisation of sanitation services in Grenoble region  
March 2000  Remunicipalisation of water supply in Grenoble 
 
 
4 Comparable events in France and internationally 
 
4.1 Problems of private water in France: the 1997 Cour des Comptes report 
The problems of the delegated contracts are not unique to Grenoble, but have been seen in a number 
of cases in France. A report in January 1997 by the French audit office, the Cour des Comptes, 
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identified recurrent problems, including lack of competition, lack of transparency, excess pricing, and 
the problem of unequal relations between municipalities and multinationals: xxxi 
 
- Lack of competition :  “repeated use of the negotiated procedure, nearly always with the same 
companies” and  “A tendency to extend existing contracts” without subjecting them to tender, 
which has created “substantial profit margins”. 
- Lack of transparency: “The lack of supervision and control of delegated public services, 
aggravated by the lack of transparency of this form of management, has led to abuses” - in one 
city, Metz, the private water company did not submit any accounts to the city council for 20 years; 
in Bandol-Savary (near Toulon) a Vivendi company charged the council twice over for the same 
treatment, every year. 
- Price rises: Water prices have risen at an average rate of 10% per year in France since 1992, but 
most of all where water has been privatised.  The companies claim that most of this is due to the 
heavy investments required, but the report found many cases where price rises had no possible 
link with investments: “The increase in prices has to be seen in relation to the privatisation of 
services”  
- Unequal power - the report repeatedly emphasises the disparity between the local authorities 
and the three giant companies. The system “left elected councillors on their own, without support, 
to deal with conglomerates wielding immense political, economic and financial power” xxxii . 
- Corruption – by the time the report came out there had also been criminal convictions for 
corruption to obtain water in Reunion, and Angouleme. xxxiii  
-  
4.1.1 The problems in Paris – February 2000 
Another audit report exposed a  similar series of problems with the water of Paris itself, privatised 
since 1985 to two PPPs, one involving Vivendi, and the other Suez-Lyonnaise. The report itself has 
been kept secret by the auditors, but a press article  published some findings: the report referred to 
“an excessive price for water”, stated that “the administrative, legal and financial arrangements are 
characterised by an absence of financial transparency” , and was not satisfied with the accounts 
submitted by Suez-Lyonnaise - the auditors estimated that the company’s “true profit margin is two 
and a half times the officially reported figure”; while Vivendi transferred money destined for repairs to 
the parent company, and carried out less repairs than it claimed. xxxiv 
4.2 International examples  
The problems are not confined to France, or to French-owned water companies. International 
experience with water supply and sanitation shows remarkable similarities with the problems emerged 
in Grenoble.  Recent reports from Tallinn and Valencia indicate that the creative techniques are alive 
and well. 
 
 - Corruption and political party links 
There is evidence or public allegations of payment of bribes to officials or politicians (eg Milan, Italy; 
Lesotho; Ghana); or indirect inducements to politicians (Nairobi, Kenya; Tallinn, Estonia). There are 
also cases where water multinationals have formed joint ventures with cronies of politicians to obtain 
concessions, including Manila, Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; Cochabamba, Bolivia. xxxv 
 
- Lack of transparency 
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Secretive decision-making processes, and non-competitive contracts, have been common in a number 
of concessions (e.g. Budapest, Hungary; Potsdam, Germany; Guayaquil, Ecuador) especially where 
regimes have been undemocratic (e.g.Casablanca, Morocco under the late King Hassan; Jakarta, 
Indonesia under former president Suharto); and the multinationals prefer the contract documents to 
remain secret (eg Gdansk, Poland; WSSA, South Africa).xxxvi  Once the decision to delegate 
management is made, lack of transparency may also lead to ineffective monitoring of the private 
operator. 
 
- Price fixing and sub-contracting  
The details of price-fixing mechanisms are not surprisingly little publicised. There are a number of 
cases where prices have been forced up within a year or two of a concession being started, where the 
assumption in the original contract about the level of demand turned out to be too high, and the real 
level of demand was then used as a justification for large price rises (eg Rostock, Germany; and most 
recently Dolphin Coast, South Africa).   There are known cases where privileged access to sub-
contracting has been part of a concession agreement, or a proposed concession eg Szeged, Hungary; 
Lodz, Poland.xxxvii 
4.2.1 Valencia – new costs after a century 
 The city of Valencia in Spain will tender for a new water concession from next year, 2002. The 
existing concession, which is held by Aguas de Valencia (Avsa),  a subsidiary of the French 
multinational SAUR, is coming to an end – after 100 years.   In late 2000,  Avsa told the council that a 
forgotten agreement made in 1962 obliged the council to contribute towards the workers pensions, 
but the council has not made these payments – so Avsa is now owed 14 m Euros, which will have to 
be repaid through an addition to the tariffs.xxxviii  In early 2001, the city council was further told  that if 
the tender is won by another company, then Avsa will claim 54m Euros in compensation for loss of 
future profits – on the advice of   PriceWaterhouseCoopers.xxxix   
4.2.2 Tallinn – new charges in the first year 
Tallinn, capital of Estonia, privatised its water company in January 2001.  It is now controlled by 
International water – a company registered in the UK, which is 50% owned by the USA construction 
company  Bechtel, and 50% owned by Edison SpA, part of the Italian group Montedison. 
 
Tallin Water was an efficient municipal company, and in May 2001 it reported that in the year 2000, 
its last year of municipal ownership, it had recorded a small profit of 24m. Estonian kroons (about 1m 
Euros).  The new owners however decided to pay themselves a dividend of  182m EK (about 7.5m 
Euros). International Water explained that Tallinn Water was overcapitalised : "European water 
companies have on the average of 47 percent of borrowed or external capital and 53 percent of 
shareholders' capital. In Tallin Water, that proportion was very much in favour of the shareholders' 
capital and payment of dividends was a good means to change it". xl 
 
Later in the same month, the company demanded that the city council should pay  an extra 2.5 m 
Euros per year for surface water drainage – although in the past the costs of this service had been 
covered by the water  tariffs. The council would thus be paying a second time for this service. xli 
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4.3 Other terminations and remunicipalisations 
Grenoble is not the only place in the world which has terminated private water concessions or 
contracts. Other such terminations include: 
 Table 4 :  Terminated water concessions and operating contracts 
Country Concession Date of 
termination 
Multinational involved 
Argentina Tucuman 1997 Vivendi 
Trinidad Country 1998 Severn-Trent 
Germany Potsdam 1999 Suez-Lyonnaise 
Thailand Pathum Thani 2000 RWE-Thames Water 
Bolivia Cochabamba 2000 International Water 
France Grenoble 2000 Suez-Lyonnaise, Vivendi 
Source: PSIRU Database 
 
5 The lessons – a dynamic political process  
The lessons of Grenoble are of global relevance.  The model of delegated management through  
concessions, or ‘public-private partnerships’, the same model as experienced at Grenoble, is being 
promoted as the preferred solution of the World Bank, the Global Water Partnership and many other 
bodies, and most of all by the multinational groups.   
 
The information that has emerged from Grenoble should improve our understanding of the economic, 
administrative and political processes at work in private concessions, delegated management or 
public-private partnerships in water.  The reality does not at all resemble the concept of public-private 
partnerships as a partnership of equals between private operators and public representatives.  
 
The lessons should affect decision-making processes. The economic and political risks of private water 
management may be much higher than is often recognised, by comparison with the risks of public 
sector operation.  
5.1 Dynamics and contracts 
The first lesson is that the whole process at Grenoble was extremely dynamic. The concessions served 
as a starting point for goal-seeking initiatives and negotiation, rather than a common  document of 
equal partners trying to make it work. This did not start with the public, political challenges and 
negotiations; the dynamic alteration of the terms of the service was happening, at the companies’ 
initiative, before the public responses. 
 
This strengthens and perhaps extends the conclusion of a recent report on the Jakarta water 
concessions, which argued that they illustrated the limitations of contracts: “The contract instrument 
cannot cope with the combined challenge of a long time horizon, high uncertainty, difficult to define 
service and problematic environment. What results are soft targets, squishy outputs, and endless 
negotiations” xlii .  The problem may be more general than this suggests: the partners at Grenoble 
were operating in much easier circumstances, yet the contracts still failed to provide much effective 
constraint on even the price of the service delivered.  
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5.2 Strategic behaviour of multinationals 
One element in this process is the clear and persistent pursuit of shareholder interest by the 
companies in Grenoble, especially Suez-Lyonnaise. This behaviour is quite normal and central to 
private businesses - both Vivendi and Suez have targets for the rate of return to be delivered to their 
shareholders, and their managers are surely rewarded for helping to achieve this role, not for helping 
to deliver water to the poor. 
 
Yet this central fact about private enterprise is rarely acknowledged in papers on privatisation of water 
or PPPs. Much advice centres on the importance of attracting companies, and even emphasising the 
need to create a ‘favourable’ (ie weak) regulatory climate. The terminology of ‘public-private-
partnership’ (PPPs) is misleading in this respect, implying that such concessions are arrangements 
between partners sharing the same goals. 
 























Grenoble shows that the company’s goals often conflict with the interests of water users and  citizens. 
It should be a working assumption that any private company will seek to maximise its returns, and the 
question should be asked at the outset, before privatisation, what the potential costs are of this. The 
key point is that such behaviour is predictable, and indeed was predicted in Grenoble itself, by 
Christian Lacroix, who wrote in 1985: “The privatisation of  commercialised local services in Grenoble, 
despite the assurances given today by M. Carignon, may take us down a very dangerous road with 
long-term damaging consequences for the water users of Grenoble - expensive private services,  
whose control by elected politicians and users will become very difficult in future years,  reflecting the 
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5.2.2 Huge gains, low risk 
The case of Grenoble also demonstrates that the potential gains to a company for engaging in this 
behaviour are great, while the risks are relatively low. Although this was perhaps the most public 
failure to get away with these tactics, where Suez-Lyonnaise executives were convicted and the 
concession terminated, their losses have been fairly small. Two (replaceable) executives spent time in 
prison, the illegal entry fees were repaid to the company, no real losses were made during the period. 
There have been no subsequent disqualification from contracts in France or anywhere else. xliv 
   
This combination of high gain and low risk means that it is worthwhile for a multinational company to 
invest in the resources, for example legal and financial advisors, to exploit these opportunities as far 
as possible.  
5.3 The range of corrupt relationships  
Grenoble also illustrates the wide range of corrupt channels which can potentially be used by 
concession-seeking companies in relation to political institutions. As the table shows, many of these 
were used at Grenoble, but there are others. 
 
The importance of corruption in this context is not the illegality of it, which depends on what the law 
happens to be in the place it occurs (what Carignon and Suez-Lyonnaise were convicted for in 
Grenoble might well have been legal in the UK).  The concern is that these mechanisms all create  
distorted incentives for politicians or officials to favour privatisation over public provision, and then to 
select the company which offers the best inducement rather than the best service.  
 
This was apparent from the outset in Grenoble, where even a major political grouping in a prosperous 
city in France was extremely susceptible to the financial patronage of a multinational company.  This 
apparently extended to all parties in respect of the SDA concession, as it appears to have done in 
relation to school building contracts in the Ile-de-France in the 1980s and 1990s,  where the same 
companies were involved. xlv 
 Table 6 :  Corrupt devices to secure concessions 
Corrupt device  Examples from Grenoble (or elsewhere) 
  
Political donations  To particular party SLE  – to RPR/Carignon 
Political donations  To all parties SDA – to all parties 




Monod chair of Lyonnaise, 
secretary of RPR 
Bribes To politician Angouleme, France 
Bribes To official Lesotho 
Entry fees /canons To municipality Paid by COGESE to Grenoble 
city council 
Payments to avoid 
competition 
To municipality France – renewals without 
tendering 
Joint venture with political 
crony 
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5.4 Technical and legal measures 
The technicalities of the over-charging at Grenoble are fascinating, the more so because similar 
techniques were reintroduced into the re-negotiated joint venture.   
 Table 7 :  Techniques for overcharging  used by Suez-Lyonnaise  
Method  Contract (COGESE, 1989-95) Joint venture (SEG, 1996-99) 
Entry Fees - Recovery of entry fees paid to city 
council  through charging users 
- City council forego eliminated entry fees 
Tariff Formula - Inflation indexing on wrong base 
- Retroactive invoicing inflating bills  
- Adjustment to consumption levels / 
price increases if consumption steady 
Subcontracting - Exclusive rights to works contracts 
- Privileged access to 
subcontracting / Discriminating 
against other bidders 
- Water supply and sanitation 
subcontracted to SGEA (100% LdE) / 
decreasing remuneration of SEG vs. 
increasing remuneration of SGEA 
- SGEA subcontract services to LdE (e.g. 
legal services, accounting,  customer 
services, technical assistance, vehicles, 
IT, management of SGEA) 
Creative accounting - Inflated costs of debt service 
- Transfer of receipts to LdE after 
first 11 years of contract 
- City council to finance works 
without recovering costs 
- City council share liability for damages 
caused by COGESE  
(e.g. damage to consumers) 
- City council assume FF 30 million of 
COGESE losses 
- City council forego dividends in favour of 
LdE 
Legal powers - secrecy of documents - effective veto for SLE over decisions, 
despite minority shares 
Sources: ADES; Eau Secours; CRC Rhône-Alpes, November 1995; SEG 
 
 
The key question is how common these practices are: and the answer is likely to be at least as 
difficult to establish in other cases as it was in Grenoble. There is enough evidence – see previous 
section - to suggest that, at least, water companies are very aware of the possibilities and the 
importance of accounting and charging practices, and that this awareness is not restricted to France, 
or to the two largest  French companies, as the two recent examples below suggest. 
 
It thus seems advisable for all public authorities considering water privatisation to familiarise 
themselves with these practices, their cost, and the authority’s capacity to curb them, before 
embarking on an invitation for private tenders. 
5.5 State capacity 
The contracts exploited the citizens for excess profits in a variety of ways which were hidden from 
view until the regional audit body Chambre régionale des Comptes Rhône-Alpes, and court cases 
brought by ADES, exposed crucial data.  Until then, the contracts were characterised by lack of 
transparency, and sophisticated financial extortion.  The unravelling of the corrupt concessions at 
Grenoble has two key features - strong state institutions and a vigorous political process. 
 
Grenoble: private to public         29/01/21 
 
 __________________________________________________________________________  
PSIRU       www.psiru.org     Page - 17 - 
 
 
The state agencies involved included the examining magistrates, who in France have a marked degree 
of autonomy and power to investigate even members of the political and economic elite; and the 
powerful autonomous public audit agencies of the Cour des comptes and the Chambres régionales des 
comptes; and the courts, which heard both criminal and civil cases.   
 
Other countries cannot rely on these bodies to rescue them from similar problems. These  institutions 
have a power which is unusual by the standards of most developed countries, and  developing 
countries are most unlikely to be able to rely on such bodies.  
 
This is an aspect of a wider argument, that where state capacity is limited, privatisation is an 
especially dangerous option.xlvi  
5.6 Political activity and intervention 
A central role was played by the political activity of a party, ADES, and its leaders, supported by other 
groups, notably the user-based organisation Eau Secours, and the trade unions.  ADES gained 
increasing electoral support for their critique of the private concessions,  and also persisted with a  
series of court cases which forced disclosure and finally won declarations that the contracts were 
illegal.  
 
The activity in Grenoble also shows that persistent political intervention into privatised water 
operations is of great benefit in uncovering and enabling the reversal of unjustified exploitations of 
the system.  This applied to the detailed exposure and criticism of technical operations, including eg 
sub-contracting practices, not simply to broad guidance every few months. It seems important that 
this kind of political intervention is encouraged, rather than curbed by a blanket  condemnation of 
‘political interference’.  
 
This point suggests the importance of distinguishing ‘political intervention’ from disreputable practices 
sometimes described as ‘political interference’ in water.  Interference by politicians in order to further 
the advantages of their party – eg by demanding unjustified price cuts, or appointments of political 
supporters or ‘cronies’ – is rightly criticised as damaging to the integrity of water as a public service. 
However, the case of Grenoble shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, such political 
interference may be instigated by private companies – the ‘cronies’ put in place are the companies 
themselves, the unjustified economic choices are to favour expensive private solutions ahead of better 
public sector ones.xlvii  
 
This reflects similar findings in analyses of water privatisations elsewhere. Recent analyses of 
Cartagena xlviii and Cordoba xlix suggest that the political institutions have an essential function in 
representing the interests of the poor – if these bodies are weak, the poor are effectively 
unrepresented, and the company interests will dominate the concessions. And recent report to the 
ILO includes case studies of  Hungarian water operations which suggest that decision-making 
benefited from a highly political debate, in both a privatised and a public sector water service.l 
5.6.1 Political action or regulation: OFWAT in the UK 
In the UK, too, political intervention now appears to have much greater impact than the autonomous 
activity of a regulator. From 1989 to 1997 the UK water regulator OFWAT was relatively inactive, 
allowing the companies to make considerable profits; after the 1997 election of a new Labour 
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government, a windfall tax was imposed on the private water companies, and OFWAT was persuaded 
to initiate far tougher controls on the UK water companies.   
 
It is interesting to consider what, if anything, is the difference between the behaviour of OFWAT and 
the behaviour of a traditional civil service, reflecting changes of political control while maintaining a 
continuity of expertise.  It would clearly be contrary to public interest in a democracy to argue that 
elected representatives should lose their powers to civil servants, yet this may be the effect of arguing 
for an ‘independent regulator’ - the neutralising of political interest.  Compare the USA model of 
regulation, which does incorporate political action and activity.  
5.7 The public sector model 
The case of Grenoble also shows the importance of the option of a public sector model, as, at the 
least, a necessary condition for good decision-making in the public interest.li  In Grenoble, the legal 
and practical possibility of a municipal régie enabled the municipality, after 10 years, to choose a 
solution which was better than any negotiable with the multinational.  
 
The option is of most relevance at the initial stages.lii Improved tendering procedures do not provide 
this choice: they allow authorities to choose which multinational to give a concession to, but the result 
is always a private concession: there is no evaluation of their proposals against a public sector option.  
It is therefore counter-productive for financial institutions such as the World Bank to impose 
conditionalities which require privatisation, thus preventing the public sector option from being 
entertained from the outset.  
 
Historically, there was a widespread European movement to remove these services of public interest 
from the private sector and run them instead by public authorities, for reasons of efficiency and 
accountability. liii (The water companies which now dominate privatised public services in water across 
the world, Vivendi and Suez-Lyonnaise, are historically the odd isolated survivors of that process, 
dinosaurs of  a species that was eradicated elsewhere: it is unwise to ignore the majority experience.  
Even if the concern is to create the cutting edge of competition, in these sectors the competitor  most 
feared by the private companies is the public sector: while it is understandable that the companies 
should be pleased if there is no consideration of a public sector provision. 
5.8 Final advice 
There are some simple practical advice points to be offered. These steps should be taken before 
deciding whether to invite tenders for a privatisation or PPP of any kind: 
 
• Develop a public sector proposal for the same service or project so that there is a real alternative, 
and a benchmark against which to assess any private bids 
 
• Consider whether the state or municipality has the institutional capacity to audit and if necessary 
prosecute a multinational company which abuses a concession 
 
• Consider whether there is enough vigorous political activity to effectively drive investigations and 
remunicipalisations if necessary 
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• Plan decision-making procedures, evaluations, and regulatory structures and economic forecasting 
on the assumption that the companies have every incentive to use the techniques of corruption 
and price-fixing if the rewards outweigh the risks.  
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